

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS

Philadelphia Chapter March 31, 2022, Virtual Meeting

Integrating Human and Organizational Performance into Safety Management

"Improving Safety Performance"

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Integrating Human and Organizational Performance into Safety Management *"Improving Safety Performance"*


Terminal Objective


Provide a practical way of improving safety performance by applying human and organizational fundamentals into safety management.


Enabling Objectives


- 1. Provide history of Safety Performance Principles including organizational, leader and individual aspects
- 2. Review how organizational values and leader behaviors influence safety culture
- 3. Describe how reducing errors & violations, minimizing risks to hazards and a defense in depth approach (hazard mitigation controls) leads to zero events
- 4. Explain how programs, process, procedures and training are vital to sustaining safety performance
- 5. Reinforce that when individuals rigorously use Safety Performance Tools and Mitigation Controls safe results are achieved












"Why did it make sense for the person to do what they did at the time of the event?" Sydney Dekker








- Defense
- Airlines





- Nuclear Industry
- Medical



Guidance and Implementation Manual Chapter 2








Safety Performance = Behaviors + Results

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- People make errors
- Error-likely situations are predictable
- Errors and risks to hazards can be reduced using safety performance tools
- Behaviors are influenced by
 - organizational values, programs, processes and job site conditions
 - what is encouraged and reinforced



 Events can be eliminated with Hazard Mitigation Controls – Defenses





Organizational Values

Three Levels of Culture

- 1. What can be seen visual cues?
- 2. Behaviors observed and reinforced.
- 3. Shared values, priorities & assumptions.

YOUR COMPANY **Building Excellence** ANYTOWN FACILITY DAYS WITHOUT A LOST TIME ACCIDENT **The Cultural Iceberg** Easy to see > customs > mores > courtesies 10 % **Difficult** to see 90 % > values > priorities > assumptions

Organizational Values


People, Plant & Environment Safety Performance Inextricably Linked




Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig April 20, 2010




- Significant Environmental Damage & Massive Clean-ups
- 11 Fatalities
- \$4.5 Billion Settlements
- Legal Issues



Adapted from INPO 06-003 Human Performance Reference Manual





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Organizational Values

Every organization is perfectly aligned to get the results it gets!

- The level of safety performance achieved is influenced by the collective behaviors of all individuals in the organization.
- People achieve high levels of safety performance based largely on the encouragement and reinforcement received from leaders, peers, and subordinates.

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Organizational Behaviors

Let's Talk Safety & Listen

Filters, Bias, Preconceived Notions



Let's Talk Safety & Listen

- Safety Leaders...
 - Lead by example
 - Engage people
 - Effectively communicate
 - Talk Safety and Listen
- Let's Talk Safety



- It takes COURAGE to speak up and be a safety leader.
- The safety **conversation** builds trust and respect!
- Listen to understand why and how work is performed. It is easy to talk, it is much harder to listen.

Safety Has No Natural Feedback Mechanism

If people take shortcuts, the <u>naturally occurring</u> <u>positive consequence</u> from doing the job with less effort can cause the undesirable behaviors to continue.



Let's Talk Safety & Listen

- 1. See something?
- 2. Say something ...ask how job is going– Listen!
- 3. Talk about safety:
 - Safe work practices(2 or 3)



□ Improvement opportunities or concerns (if any)

4. Give thanks and summarize

See Something ... Say Something!

Let's Talk Safety & Listen

Examples

Safe Behaviors

"I thought you did a nice job with keeping your eyes on the task because it just takes a second for something to happen."

(Pause)

"And I saw you stayed clear of the moving parts which is good, so your hands don't get cut or pinched."

(Pause)

"And I thought it was good that you kept the tools and materials away from the machinery so that nothing rolls in and gets kicked back out." Opportunity "I just wanted to ask you if those are the best gloves for this type of task?"

Improvement

"Thanks again, any questions for me?"



Errors and Violations

Unintended "Not *Thinking*"



Intended "Thinking"





Safety Performance Key Error Traps



Time Pressure



Distractions



Inaccurate Risk Perception



Assumptions

Errors Violations Hazards Risks Safety Error Trap Time Pressure










Safety Error Trap Assumptions



Safety Error Trap Inaccurate Risk Perception



Basic Safety Hazards

- Working from heights
- Spills on floors or trip hazards
- Stuck-by or caught-in between
- Unguarded machinery
- Overexertion
- Ergonomic
- Unseen



Is the Risk to the Hazard Acceptable?



Respect the Risk to Hazards



Safety Improves when the Risk to Hazards is Eliminated, Reduced or Controlled with Defenses and Safety Performance Tools!

OSHA Regulations







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Pocket Safety and Human Performance Manuals





Safety Performance Handbook



Employee Environmental, Health, and Safety Handbook Manufacturing Operations

	Contents
Section 1	General Safety – Policy
1.1. RES	PONSIBILITIES
1.2. LIFE	SAVING RULES
1.3. INCI	DENT REPORTING
1.4. GEN	ERAL SAFETY RULES
1.5. HOU	SEKEEPING
1.6. PER	SONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
Section 2	Hazard Assessment & Safety Performance Tool
2.1. HAZ	ARD ASSESSMENT/HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS
2.2. STO	WORK
2.3. PRE-	JOB RISK ASSESSMENT
2.4. POS	T-JOB BRIEF
2.5. WOF	K S.A.F.E.R.
2.6. TWO	-MINUTE RULE
2.7. JOB	HAZARD ANALYSIS (JHA)
2.8. FOLL	OW THE RULES





Pre-job Brief

<u>What</u>

A Pre-job Brief is an interactive discussion involving all team members to ensure all potential hazards, risks and lessons learned from previous performance are addressed.

<u>Why</u>

To ensure safe task completing by identifying hazards and hazard mitigation controls that will be used.

<u>How</u>

Usually conducted by the Supervisor close to the job site. Consider conducting it in a reverse manner (worker leads discussion) to assess understanding by participants.

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OSHA 1910.269 Job Brief

- Hazards associated with job
- Work procedures involved
- Special Precautions
- Energy source control
- Personal Protective Equipment requirements

Focus on Confirmation Bias

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Agency: Pilot in Bryant crash erred

Tom Schad USA TODAY

The National Transportation Safety Board concluded Tuesday that pilot Ara Zobayan's poor decision-making likely caused the helicopter crash that killed NBA star Kobe Bryant and eight others last year.

The NTSB found that Zobayan was flying under visual flight rules, which means he had to be able to see where he was going, but decided to fly into thick clouds, where he became spatially disoriented. The NTSB identified "self-induced pressure and plan continuation bias" as likely contributing factors in Zobayan's decision-making.

Investigators also attributed fault to the company that operated the flight, Island Express Helicopters, citing its "inadequate review and oversight of its safety management processes."

"By most measures, the interviews that we conducted, the pilot was well thought of, well-regarded. He was the chief pilot. Had good credentials," NTSB chairman Robert Sumwalt said during a board meeting about the findings. "I think this illustrates that even good pilots can end up in bad situations."

The NTSB's long-awaited findings come a little more than a year after the Sikorsky S-76B helicopter crashed into the hills near Calabasas, California, on Jan. 26, 2020.



An official inspects the remains of a helicopter the day after a crash killed Kobe Bryant; his daughter, Gianna; and seven others. NTSB/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

All nine people on board died in the crash, including Bryant and his 13-yearold daughter, Gianna; John and Keri Altobelli and their daughter, Alyssa; Sarah Chester and her daughter, Payton; Christina Mauser, an assistant coach; and Zobayan. The group had been traveling to Thousand Oaks for a youth basketball game.

Experts and investigative records had long pointed to spatial disorientation as a likely factor in the crash.

NTSB investigators said Tuesday that from 2010 to 2019, the board found 194 fatal aircraft accidents related to spatial disorientation.

Over the course of a four-hour board

meeting, NTSB investigators and board members also repeatedly referenced Zobayan's decision to proceed into poor weather rather than land the helicopter at nearby Van Nuys Airport and wait it out.

Investigator-in-charge Bill English referenced this when asked if having a second pilot on board might have helped avoid the tragedy.

"We don't see any specific factors in this accident that directly relate to single-pilot vs. dual-pilot – for example, workload," English said. "It doesn't take much workload to turn the helicopter around and land it at Van Nuys. It takes a good decision and good support to do that."

English also said that while investigators found deficiencies in Island Express Helicopter's safety procedures, it is not considered a "rogue" or "problem" company.

Investigators added that there is no evidence to suggest that the actions of the air traffic controllers contributed to the crash in any way,

Bryant, who was 41, was wellknown for traveling by helicopter during his career with the Los Angeles Lakers and in retirement. He viewed it as a way to avoid the oft-gridlocked traffic in Los Angeles and the surrounding area. He had previously flown in the aircraft that crashed and traveled regularly with Zobayan.



A SAFETY MINUTE WHEN STARTING, RETURNING OR INTERRUPTED AT THE JOBSITE...

- 1. Explore: (Look up, down & around)
 - Recognize hazards & controls
 - Any potential challenges?
- 2. Review / Follow Rules
 - Life Saving Rules / JSA / Job Brief
 - PPE / Safety Equipment

3. Perform Final Safety Check

- What is the worst that can happen and why won't it?
- Have all questions been answered?



STOP if Unsure and Seek Help!

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Understand & Follow Rules

<u>What</u>

The rules reflect best practices in the work-place, and many are required by OSHA. Following rules means that individuals understand the rule's intent and purpose and follow them as written.



<u>Why</u>

- To safeguard yourself and coworkers
- To ensure the correct actions are performed in the proper sequence and reduce risk of error.
- Ensures that we stay in "positive control" of the plant; the only thing that happens is what we expect to happen.

Life Saving Rules

CRAFT

- Confined Space
- **R**igging and Lifting
- Arc Flash / Electrical
- Fall Protection
- Tagging Energy Source Control



Attention Focus Self and Peer Check



Self-Check focuses attention on the task, to think about the intended action and its expected response before performance, and verify actions taken after performance. STAR (Stop, Think, Act, and Review) is a technique to self check.

Peer-Check is a series of actions by two individuals working together at the same time and place, before and during a specific action, to prevent an error by the performer.



Effective Communication

<u>What</u>


Effective Communication is clear, concise, and free of ambiguity. It is provided in a way that minimizes the chance of being misunderstood. Especially, when exchanges of information directly manipulate equipment or are critical actions.

<u>Why</u>

- To minimize the potential for making errors.
- To provide for the accurate, complete, concise, clear, and error-free transfer of information.
- To ensure the receiver of the message listens to and understands the message sent.

<u>How</u>

It is performed using Three-Part Communications, the phonetic alphabet and the noun names of equipment and components.



Stop When Unsure

<u>What</u>

STOP Work is a brief interruption work to discuss and resolve assumptions, uncertainty, changing conditions, or other potential unsafe conditions.

<u>Why</u>

- To reduce errors and exposure to hazards
- To ensure good decisions are made during work performance
- To challenge preconceptions and assumptions

<u>When</u>

Personnel are authorized to stop work and seek help if an actual or potential unsafe condition is present, but especially when:

- The task is determined to be unsafe
- Confusion or concerns are identified
- Unanticipated changes in conditions are encountered
- Conflict or inconsistencies exist between plans, rules, procedures, instructions, and actual conditions
- You or others think or say the following words and phrases: "Probably, Tassume, Think, Maybe, Should be, Not sure, We've always, I'm 90% certain"



Post Job Brief

<u>What</u>

A Post-Job Brief is performed to gather information and lessons learned from workers after task completion.

<u>Why</u>

- To ensure that the work site has been cleaned up
- To ensure that job status is communicated
- To identify what worked well and any opportunities for improvement

<u>When</u>

After task completion.

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Typical Post Job Brief

- What worked well?
- What can be improved?
- What lessons were learned that need to be captured and passed on to others?



Journey to Improve Safety Performance

Phase 1 Safety Culture Assessment Discovery & Analysis

- Incident data (2-year period)
- Safety standards & reports
- Safety Meetings
- · Field observations / interviews
- Design & conduct safety survey

Phase 3 Safety Performance Training

- Senior Leadership
- Mangers & Supervisors
- Employees

Phase 5

Let's Talks Safety and Listen

- Safety Observation Program
- Training



Hazards and Risk

- Recognize Hazards
- Assess Risks
- Mitigation Controls

Phase 2 Safety Performance Introduction & Assessment Workshops

- Safety Professionals
- · Senior Management
- Union Leaders

Phase 4 Strategic Plan & Performance Measures

 Senior Leadership Workshops



Commitment to a Safety Strategic Plan Example

Safety Performance **Strategic** Plan TARGE 7 E Director, Site Operations Maintenance Director, Performance Improvement

Director Engineering

Outage & Work Management

Site Vice-President

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	Strategic Plan
Ou	Vision
Hurr Obje focu	eople at are committed to excellence in Safety & in Performance. A Strategy has been developed in support of the Strategic drives for Safe Event-free Plant Operation. An action plan has been developed to add to this initiative, as well as emphasize ownership and accountability. The signatures document signify the individual's ownership and accountability to this plan.
	Manager, Operations
	Superintendent, Unit 1 Operations
	Superintendent, Unit 2 Operations
	Manager Maintenance
	SuperIntendent, Instrument & Control Maintenance
	Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance
	Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance
	Superintendent, Planning & Support
	Superintendent, Maintenance Services
	Superintendent, FIN Team
	Superintendent, Nuclear Construction
	Manager, Site Projects
	Manager, Nuclear Training
	Chemistry Manager
	Manager, Radiation Protection
	Manager, Design Engineering
	Manager, Plant & Equipment Engineering
	Manager, Technical Services Engineering
	Manager, Work Management
	Manager, Outage Management
	Manager, Site Protection
	Manager, Human Resources
	anager, Regulatory Compliance

Safety Performance

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Safety Performance Measures

Traditional	Leading "Proactive" Measures	
"Reactive" Measures		
Compliance driving the Safety program	 Leadership "Walks the Talk" Leaders motivating employees to own 	
Low employee involvement	 safety & go beyond minimal standards Recognition for use of Safety Performance Tools & Defenses 	
 Training heavily focused on technical aspects of job 		
 Focus on a single cause Correct the individual failure 	 Focus on hazard exposure and risk Employees involved in developing and implementing safety training programs 	
Narrowly apply solutions	 All Training includes "soft" skills Focus on organizational root cause Correcting system/process deficiencies 	
 OSHA Recordable injuries Lost Time Accidents 		
 Worker Compensation Cost Regulatory violations 	 Recognize a near miss or good catch Improvement Opportunities Self Assessments Safety Perception Surveys 	

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Safety Performance Strategic Plan Example

Safety Assessment Gaps / Recommendations	Actions	Proactive Performance Measures
1.Increase focus on learning from incidents	 Reset the criteria to determine what type and depth of investigation is necessary Review and enhance the method/tools for investigation Improve and standardize corrective action process and method of communication to ensure learning is shared and issue is fixed everywhere it is applicable Pilot Culpability Model 	1. Potential Significant Injury or Fatality Near Misses and trend analysis
2.Define expectations and leadership behaviors to align performance measures update, coach and reinforce standards and expectations for safety performance		 Management & Supervisor Observations and Coaching – amount and quality Pre-job briefing - amount and quality Assessments of use of Safety Performance Tools and Hazard Controls Job Hazard Analysis and Safety Procedures – amount and quality

Safety Performance in Action


"Safety is not the lack of injuries, it's the use of safety performance tools and the presence of defenses"




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work to do a bad job. If what s/he did made sense to work to do a bad job. If what whe did made sense to limithe, it probably makes some to other as well. The summarized sense of the sense of the sense of the summarized sense of the sense of the sense to de their jobs, not post lumit, the digital is a limit despet to identify organizational factors that influence individual behaviors is warmarized. In the sover possible scenaris, the discovery of the sense of the sense of the sense flav or problem existed, leading to the event. All the individ-ual behavioral dampart actions in the world will not improve the sense of the sense flav or problem existed, leading to the event. All the individ-ual behavioral dampart actions in the world will not improve the sense of the sense (not market). •What about the behaviors of the leaders? Does the investigation include review of the work situation that existed when the event or injury occurred? ·Does it include supervisor and manager follow-up to identify how they may have influenced (or did not influence) on-theioh hebay 44 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY NOVEMBER 2019 assp.org

Does the investigation include reviewing preparations for job performance, what job previews, hazard analysis, walk downs or prejob briefings occurred before work commenced? What previous operating experience, if any, existed before

•What previous operating experimenc, if any, existed before this performance? •What was the focus of the job briet? •Ohrn, the focus before and during the task is on what it takes to get the job done. High-reliability oppnizations also focus on what no avoid while alactering ascess. A blue twie persident at a modern power plant an methaword Ohio has prest works to core-sider what be neight advecting. Whet is well as the immersessing to perform the job correctly the first time, we just don't have any line to twaste:

Safety Performance Process Safety performance combines industrial safety, human per

Safety performance combines industrial safety, human per-formance and organizational performance into one process to protect people, the property (dnail) and place (environment). The safety performance process has sick key elements starting with organizational behaviors and rotating clockwise toward safe results (Figure 1). Simple-to-use programs, processes and procedures, and hazard risk analysis are vital parts of the safety performance process. However, they alone do not guarantee success. To be effective, the alignment of behaviors of the orga-nization, leaders and individuals is needed. Each aspect of the safety performance process is outlined here.

Organizational Behaviors Safety starts with the culture of the organization. Safety

Safety attas with the culture of the organization. Safety performance is management-sponsore and alcoholing-diver-ting the culture of the company, from the board of directres to the workers in the field. After providing human performance training at a power sta-tion in weiter Descriptiona, intaining defined, was addead to the strength energy of the strength of the strength meeting, was held to discuss the subject material. During the meeting, was held to discuss the subject material, During the meeting, was held to discuss the subject material. During the meeting, was held to discuss the subject material, During the meeting was held to discuss the subject material, the subject of Attendes commented bat the fight side the training, but the data their supervisors would not let them use the human perfor-mance techniques,

time toget to be a set of the set

Every organization has leaders like this informal leader at all levels of the organization. It is critical to identify and engage these leaders to improve safety performance. While interacting with hundreds of companies and thousands of employees, the authors have often been asked, "How can we reduce errors?" After analyzing hundreds of consequential we reduce errors?" After analyzing hundrels of consequentia events, a fore counce themes sound propered. First, individu-tion of the second and more importantly, defenses to protect against roots. Second, and more importantly, defenses to protect against errors were either Heavel or missing. To further investigation, the authors frequently identified an organizational weakness, if a program was in pacte to robuse errors and ensure defenses, it was inconsistently applied. Worst case, there was no program, systemsic approach, to protect individuals and the exagamation.

View paper at website: https://www.safetyperformance.us/news

Thank You

You are successful when others are successful!

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